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Decolonising Sex: Fifty Shades of Rape 
 
Roseline K. Njogu  
 
(Riara University Law School) 
 
 
This article explores how ideas of patriarchy have shaped the nature and effect of rape law. It argues 
that rape law reinforces patriarchy, and because of the inherent inconsistencies between the male 
roles of aggressor and protector, it has remained ineffective. Taking Kenya as its springboard, it 
analyses how ideas of sexual relations within and outside marriage are transplanted through 
colonialism; and how they morph and merge with analogous indigenous conceptions to entrench and 
formalise the continued subjugation of the female body. It explores the unintended consequences of 
the internationalisation of English Monogamy; and rape law reform and its continuity/discontinuity 





Colonialism, in many ways, was predicated upon Antony Anghie’s (2005) dynamic of 
difference that constructed the world in a dichotomy of the civilised and the savages (Mutua, 
2001). Perhaps the starkest of these differences was in the formations around which society 
organised itself. The concept of marriage in English law, and in many of Britain’s colonies, 
was at complete variance. Thus, the Civilising Mission set out, in part, to reform and 
discipline the marital relationships of these poor polygamous pagans. 
In colonial and pre-colonial Africa, the differences between the English and various 
African forms of marriage seemed irreconcilable. On these alien forms of marriage, the 
colonial courts repeatedly pronounced themselves with disdain and judicial disgust.1 
Invariably, they echoed Lord Penzance in Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee2 in proclaiming the 
superiority of English monogamy over indigenous marriage systems: ‘marriage … defined as 
the voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others’ quickly 
became the marker of sophistication and civilisation on the family arena (Kang’ara, 2012). 
                                                             
 I thank Willy Mutunga, Sundhya Pahuja, James Gathii, Makau Mutua, John S. Mbiti, Eric Kibet, Kennedy 
Mukuna, Ngina Mutava, Dan Omondi and Sylvia Kang’ara for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. 
Earlier versions of this paper were also presented to working groups both at TLSI, King’s College London 
(2015) and IGLP Africa Workshop (2016) who gave me valuable feedback. Any errors are mine. 
1 See for example Rex v Amkeyo (1917) 7 EALR where Hamilton J in refusing to extend the protection of 
privileged communication to a wife of a polygamous man, called African forms of marriage ‘concubinage’ and 
wife purchase. 
2 (1886) L.R. 130 




2. Pre-Colonial African Forms of Marriage  
 
Certain elements of the African concept of marriage3 were indefensibly inequitable and 
thoroughly discriminatory. John S. Mbiti’s description exposes their philosophical 
underpinning: 
 
Marriage is the meeting-point for the three layers of human life … the departed, the living and 
those to be born. The departed … are the roots on whom the living stand. The living are the 
link between death and life. Those to be born are the buds in the loins of the living, and 
marriage makes it possible for them to germinate and sprout (Mbiti, 1991: p. 98). 
 
Marriage was a heavily loaded concept with various stakeholders beyond the contracting 
couple. The departed or the living-dead were considered a party to the ceremony as they 
guided everyday life, and could intervene in the affairs of the living.4 Their invocation had 
spiritual repercussions and situated marriage in the realm of religious5 regulation.  
The living encapsulated the couple, as well as their extended family, clan(s) and 
sometimes the tribe. Beyond the contemporary understanding of community, society was a 
rightful party in marriage with standing, and with justiciable rights and obligations. For 
example, in many Kenyan communities, it was the bridegroom’s family’s responsibility to 
pay dowry to the bride’s father, and thus ‘marry a wife for their son.’ Conversely, fathers had 
the right to reject their child’s choice of spouse, and enforce an agreement to marry.6 In some 
communities, brothers of the husband had the right to chastise a ‘wayward’ wife, while 
others allowed a man’s age-mate to have intercourse with his wife. In a polygamous 
marriage, the number of stakeholders increased exponentially, as did the rules governing the 
particularised resulting relations. 
Perhaps the most important stakeholder in a marriage were ‘those to be born.’ 
Pronatalism underpinned African marriages. Children were considered a marker of wealth, 
distinction, and free labour. They were inextricably linked to a person’s status and 
guaranteed property rights. A childless woman had no honour, no status and her access to 
                                                             
3 I am aware that this characterisation is problematic. African marriages are as varied as the communities in 
various states in Africa are. However, certain similarities exist. I use this problematic term, however, to mean 
marriages of indigenous African communities as contrasted with the colonising English forms. 
4 For more on ancestralism, particularly the concept of the living dead and their influence on activities of the 
living, see generally Mbiti (1991). 
5 Religion is a deeply divided concept in African tradition. I use this word while accepting Talal Asad’s (1993) 
contention that in certain cultures (and certainly in Africa) religion/faith is not a separate anthropological 
category. 
6 In Amulan Ogwang v Edward Ojok (unreported), a father ‘repossessed’ his daughter from her husband for 
failure to complete bride price payments. 
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property was reduced. Further, children were seen as the rebirth of ancestors gone.7 Thus 
marriage became an enterprise in the production and reproduction of life, with little regard 
for the incidental injustice it occasioned on women. This led to two main inequalities. 
Firstly, marriage was co-existent with the life of the wife. Upon a husband’s death, the 
wife was still bound to her dead husband, and independent remarriage was not a possibility. 
To secure the husband’s lineage and continue to provide maintenance to the widow, 
practices like wife/widow inheritance developed. Generally, separation or divorce came at 
such a high material and reputational cost to a woman, that it constructively was not an 
option. A woman’s only escape from an unkind husband was death – her death. 
Secondly, in addition to endemic systemic polygamy, forms of marriage that amplified 
the utility of procreation evolved. High infant mortality rates that threatened the existence 
of the clan, the increased productivity that came with a large number of wives and children, 
the perceived high socio-economic status associated with having many children made 
polygamy extremely attractive. Further, since women’s bodies were ideologically 
understood as incapable of owning or inheriting property, widows could only exercise such 
ownership through the agency of a man; an inheriting brother in law, a kinsman redeemer 
of sorts. Thus, various communities employed ethno-specific marriage forms, but the 
laundry list included levirate marriages, woman-to-woman marriage, sororate unions and 
forcible marriages.  
Beyond these forms that treated women as inputs in the production of bio-power, 
other practices tangential to marriage and sexual relationships, such as wife-chastisement 
and compulsory female circumcision, further subjugated women. Since personal status and 
property systems were inextricably linked to marriage, the subjugation of women, by 
marriage, was complete. 
The regulation of the female body and sexual conduct happened against this 
patriarchal background. The tools of this regulation had over time been fashioned for and by 
men. The African woman’s body needed a savior. He arrived, in fairy tale fashion, waving the 
Union Jack. He offered English monogamy as salvation to the body so encumbered. 
 
3. English Monogamy: A False Messiah 
 
The notion that English forms of marriage were superior to their African counterparts, 
particularly in terms of protection to wives, was false. Granted, monogamy protects a wife 
from the vicissitudes of ‘sharing’ her husband (and therefore potentially diminishing her 
claim to wealth, entitlement, and status) with her co-wives. Further, embracing English 
marriage removed a wife from the realm of custom and the vagaries of the wielders of 
                                                             
7 This belief was expressed in nomenclature. Many names were either identical to grandparent’s names, or 
spoke of the reincarnation of ancestors. For example, the Meru name Muriuki; Njoki or Kariuki in Kikuyu; 
Mutunga, Nzioki, Nzioka and Kasyoka in Kamba all mean ‘(s)he who has come back to life’. 
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customary law power.8 However, monogamy did not vest it in the wife. It consolidated 
societal power and years of customary tradition, sealed it with Anglicanism and bestowed it 
upon her husband. And that ‘Monogamy Power’ was ominous and had potentially 
devastating consequences. 
Consider the Doctrine of Coverture on which English monogamy was predicated. Sir 
William Blackstone’s language exposes portentous intentions shrouded in the language of 
protection: 
 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and 
consolidated into that of the husband: under whose wing, protection and cover she performs 
everything ... Under this principle of an union of person in husband and wife, depend almost 
all the legal right, duties and disabilities, that either of them acquire by the marriage.9  
 
Coverture imbued a wife with certain disabilities, concerning property, reminiscent of a 
minor or a person with a mental disability. Specifically, a femme covert could not own 
property, enter into contracts, or obtain an education against her husband's wishes. Any 
property she owned before her marriage automatically vested on her husband at marriage, 
as did any property that she came to during her marriage. Marriage was the vehicle that 
disinherited women, and wherefrom there could be no disembarkation (Mill, 1869). 
Coverture transgressed the thin line between property and person. No tort causes 
could arise between spouses. In certain instances, a wife’s mental capacity was considered 
reduced, ipso facto, when she acted in her husband’s presence.  Specifically, if a woman 
committed a crime in the presence of her husband, the law automatically considered her his 
agent – a defence of compulsion existed. That such a defence arose, as a matter of course, is 
perhaps the strongest indicator of Monogamy Power’s denial of a woman’s agency. 
Coverture also ceded the woman’s body to her husband’s control. Until 1891, a 
husband could lawfully chastise his wife and confine her. Coleridge J. in Re Cochrane10 held 
that ‘the husband hath by law power and dominion over his wife and may keep her by force 
within the bounds of duty, and may beat her, but not in a violent or cruel manner.’ He also 
had the right to consortium11 and a wife had a corresponding duty to provide it, and this 
right could be enforced through incarceration.12 Inherent in this right, was the right to sexual 
intercourse. Since a husband had unfettered access to and control over his wife, and she was 
                                                             
8 In Cole v Cole 1898 1 NLR 15 for example, early in the colonial state, a widow was able to secure her 
inheritance against her husband’s relatives by pleading English monogamy therefore enjoying protection 
against patriarchal customary rules of inheritance. 
9 Sir William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Law of England Vol 1 (1765). 
10 (1840) 8 Dow PC 630. The court was finally overruled in 51 years later in R v Jackson [1891] 1 QB 671, CA. 
11 Defined as company, affection and society of one’s spouse and included the right to sexual intercourse, 
cohabitation, the right of a wife to use her husband’s name and so on. 
12 supra note 14 
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essentially his agent, then the idea that she could deny him sexual intercourse was 
preposterous. Consent to sex, for life, a core element of Monogamy Power, was 
presumed/acquired at marriage. She exchanged her agency for his cover – and therefore, 
there could be no rape in marriage. 
The Hale doctrine expressed this subjugation in poetic eloquence: 
 
But the husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by himself upon his lawful wife, for by 
their mutual matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up herself in this kind 
unto her husband, which she cannot retract.   
 
English monogamy was a false Messiah. While proclaiming freedom and equality to the 
captives of African customary marriage law, it exchanged one form of subjugation for 
another (Nyamu-Musembi, 2000). The African monogamous husband became the fulfillment 
of custom and law: the wielder of Monogamy Power, and the most eloquent expression of 
patriarchy.  
Coverture was the nail on the coffin that was a woman’s agency; and its legacy and 
other notions of patriarchy continue to impact family and rape law in much of post-colonial 
Africa.  
 
4. 50 Shades of Rape: Patriarchy, Marriage and the Law 
 
Rape law was undergirded by patriarchy and therefore was at best severely crippled, and at 
worst, still born (Davis, 1981; Crenshaw, 1989). The narrative of the development of rape 
law is framed against a somewhat schizophrenic man, who is at once an aggressor and 
protector.13 As protector, he seeks to shield his would be bride from being deflowered by a 
stranger; or his daughters from the stigma of marriage without seal of virginity; or his 
children from the woes of disputed paternity. Clearly, the shield here really is for his own 
cover: to protect his right to deflower his own bride, his reputation, and his lineage, 
respectively. As aggressor, he seeks to escape the clutches of rape law, so he fashions it with 
crippled hands. 
The imperial control of rape law by patriarchy is the strongest expression of 
Monogamy Power. The legal definition of rape betrays this heritage. S 139 (now repealed) 
of the Penal Code of Kenya defined rape as the ‘unlawful carnal knowledge of a woman or 
girl without her consent or with her consent if the consent is obtained through force, 
coercion or false representations or in the case of a married woman, by personating her 
husband.’ Carnal knowledge was further defined in the language of penetrating the vagina 
with a penis. 
                                                             
13 I owe this picture of a man as the aggressor-protector to Sylvia Kang’ara who also read earlier drafts of this 
work. 
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This penetration-centred definition does not capture women’s experience of sexual 
activity. It is clinical, and does not speak to the nuances of foreplay, repeated penetration, 
continued copulation, or non-penetrative sex as part of a continuous sexual transaction. This 
fixation with a one-way domination and aggression has its origins in marriage law. At 
Common Law, a marriage was void for non-consummation. So central was the idea of 
penetration that in Corbett v Corbett14 the court held that the penetration of an artificially 
(surgically) created vagina in the case of a post-operative male-to-female transsexual person 
did not rise to the threshold of consummation. Further, since impotence would vitiate 
consummation, it is conceivable that a man suffering from erectile dysfunction could not use 
an artificially created aid to penetrate his wife, and thus consummate the marriage. The law 
seemed married (pardon the pun) to the idea that marriage was anchored around a man’s 
penetrating, conquering role.15 Even at the wedding night, he was expected to be the (gentle) 
aggressor.  
Under the Penal Code, rape was classified as a crime against morality, alongside living 
off the proceeds of prostitution and running brothels. It was constructed not as a violation 
of a woman’s rights or body, but as a mere blemish on society’s standards of decorum. This 
definition has changed somewhat, and years of feminist activism have yielded considerable 
results in rape law reform including the enactment of the Sexual Offences Act (SOA) of 2006. 
Section 3 (1) of the SOA redefines rape in gender neutral terms viz. ‘[a] person commits the 
offence termed rape if he or she intentionally and unlawfully commits an act which causes 
penetration with his or her genital organs; the other person does not consent to the 
penetration; or the consent is obtained by force or by means of threats or intimidation of any 
kind.’ This definition reframes the aggressor-victim relationship in gender-neutral terms and 
by so doing begins the journey to subvert patriarchy’s hold on sex and rape. 
The new law makes a number of important interventions including creating new 
sexual offences such as gang rape,16 expanding the definition of rape, imposing minimum 
mandatory sentences, creating the framework for DNA data banking and a sex offenders’ 
registry, among others (Kamau, Nyaundi and Serwanga, 2013). Indeed, the SOA makes bold 
steps in expanding the justice spaces for rape victims. While acknowledging the progress 
that has been made, I wish to highlight inherent defects in the architecture of the law that 
continue the legacy of patriarchy’s imperial hold on rape law.  
Firstly, the Act still defines rape in the language of penetration. I have already 
demonstrated that penetration is a man’s experience of sexual intercourse, not a woman’s. A 
theory of sex constructed around penetration denies the agency of the actors once the 
                                                             
14 [1971] 2 All ER 33 
15 There has been some movement in this area. The Marriage Act of 2014 that consolidates all family law 
regimes now considers unconsummated marriages voidable at the option of the parties, not void ab initio as 
was the Common Law position. 
16 Such as sexual assault, sexual harassment, deliberate infection with HIV/AIDS, child trafficking for sexual 
exploitation and child pornography, among others. 
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transaction is afoot. It assumes that after penetration there can be no withdrawal of consent. 
After all, how can you recall a conquering army once you have been overrun? 
Recall that the SOA is a child of international feminist movements and is informed by 
globalisation of the law and of the women’s movement. Unfortunately, this law reform 
agenda, akin to the Civilising Mission and the conversion to monogamy a century before it, 
suffers from the same blind spots (Halley, 2008a). It attempts to propagate women’s rights 
within a patriarchal superstructure. In so doing, it continues the narrative of subjugation and 
exclusion. Some national organic movements have had some success, at deconstructing this 
superstructure. In Maryland,17 for example, and in much of the USA, rape is defined in 
language that better describes the sexual experience of women and therefore countenances 
situations of the withdrawal of consent post penetration. New Zealand holds a similar 
position.18 There is need to define rape in non-penetration language without downgrading 
the offence to sexual or indecent assault.19  
In the efforts to criminalise and effectively prosecute rape in war through the making 
of the Rome Statute, the feminist movement was able to reconstruct rape, in domestic 
spheres and at peacetime, as a continuous war against women (Kapur, 2014; Halley, 2008b). 
These reconstructions and other feminist ideas travelled and informed national discourses 
on rape law, and perhaps even became ‘sufficiently institutionalised’ (Otto, 2010). Perhaps 
the most helpful turn in international law, in departing from penetration-based definitions 
of rape is found in Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu20 where the ICTR Trial Chamber wrote:  
 
The Chamber considers that rape is a form of aggression and that the central elements of the 
crime of rape cannot be captured in a mechanical description of objects and body parts. The 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment does not catalogue specific acts in its definition of torture, focusing rather on the 
conceptual frame work of state sanctioned violence.  
 
In this classic twist, the Court refuses to be bound by mechanistic descriptions –  such as 
penetration, vaginas and penises – and focuses instead on the conceptual or perhaps power 
dialectic within which nonconsensual sex happens. The SOA would have benefitted much 
from taking this approach. 
                                                             
17 See Baby v State as discussed in Huff (2009) where the Maryland court held that after a woman’s withdrawal 
of consent post-penetration, where a man continued penetration for five or six seconds more, this amounted 
to rape. Cf Paul Ng’ang’a Kamau v. Republic where the court stated that a woman may withdraw consent at any 
time before the sexual act.  
18 Kaitamaki v R [1984] 2 All ER 435 where the court held that sexual intercourse starts on penetration and 
‘continues’ until it stops. If the act continues when consent is withdrawn the offense is complete. This case is 
still problematic, for purposes of this article, because it construes intercourse as beginning at penetration. 
19 The Rome Statute, for example, uses the language of ‘sexual violence’ and leaves this undefined. The 
ambiguity has been instrumental in allowing the court to give varying cultural constructions of ‘sexual 
violence’. 
20 Case No. ICTR-96-4 




Secondly, the Act gives a spousal rape exemption that ominously echoes the Hale 
Doctrine. The import of s.43(5) is to exclude the application of rape provisions from 
spouses.21 The law continues to take this hands-off approach to domestic violence and 
marital rape, relegating it to the ‘private sphere’ where the law ostensibly cannot reach 
(Engle, 2005; Kapur, 2002; Charlesworth, 1996). This augments Monogamy Power. Granted, 
wives can rape husbands too, but by and large, the proclivity has been one of male 
domination and female subordination, and that is the focus of this article. Spousal rape is 
thus relegated to the civil sphere through constituting it as grounds for divorce. 
Finally, rape law has created its others and established ‘new forms of exile’ (Otto, 
2009). In true structuralist form, the rape victim must fit a certain mould to enjoy protection. 
She must be a single, young, pious, modestly dressed woman raped in broad daylight by a 
brutish stranger at gun point, amidst desperate screams. Single; because a married woman 
cannot be raped by her husband. Further, in many African communities, a person who raped 
a married woman paid her husband compensation. The woman got no justice. These cultural 
notions continue to influence how rape is understood and treated by victims, their support 
structures and the criminal justice system. Young; because an older woman ought to ‘know 
better’. The persecution of rape victims along this line is common. She must be modestly 
dressed because a provocatively dressed woman was ‘asking for it’, and thus ‘consent’ could 
conveniently be inferred. In both these cases, res ipsa loquitur becomes a living doctrine in 
criminal law. She must be pious because the law does not protect women of loose virtue. 
Under S 3 of the Evidence Act, a rape victim’s credibility can be impeached by showing that 
she is generally of immoral character. The tacit ‘requirement’ to fight off her attacker with 
Herculean strength, even to her dignified death, cannot be understated. If she survives, 
defence counsel will destroy whatever dignity she has left at trial. Once this mould of the 




The Civilising Mission attempted to, inter alia, liberate and dignify the African female body 
of the shackles of custom, systemic polygamy, violence and subjugation. It did so by rejecting 
African forms of marriage, and superimposing ‘superior’ English forms. Through a blend of 
large-scale legal transplant and incentives, the colonial state offered English monogamy as 
the panacea to the African woman’s subjugated body. However, monogamy, though well 
intended, had unfortunate unintended consequences. The notion that it was protective of 
women’s rights was based on a faulty predicate – monogamy was not a union of equals, but 
an imperial conquest of a man over his wife, and an assimilation of her body, agency and 
property onto his person. Thus, African monogamy took a menacing turn. Under these 
                                                             
21 See Kamau et al, supra at note 22 
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conditions, the male privilege inherent in custom and assumed from Common Law as infused 
by ideas of Coverture fused into ominous Monogamy Power that continued the chain of 
subjugation. 
This legacy of patriarchy has shaped the contours of rape law rendering it impotent 
for the protection of women. The schizophrenic patriarchal lawmaker, at once the aggressor 
and the protector, created a law that only protected women at the convenience of men. The 
rape law reform project, informed by globalisation of thought and law, continues to suffer 
from potentially catastrophic blind spots. Particularly, it continues to construct rape in 
masculine terms. Until rape law is infiltrated and reconstructed, reflecting women’s and 
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